

**L.50 : Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International Security and Disarmament.**

**Statement by Mr. Rakesh Sood, Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, October 17, 2002**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to introduce the resolution entitled "The Role of Science and Technology in the context of International Security and Disarmament" contained in document A/C.1/57/L.50, under agenda item No. 62 co-sponsored by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam and Zambia.

Mr. Chairman, India has, since 1989 brought before this Committee along with our co-sponsors a Resolution entitled "Role of Science and Technology in the context of International Security and Disarmament".

This is an issue of fundamental importance to the international community in general and to the developing world in particular. The progress in science and technology, especially the recent momentous advances offer immense possibilities for development. However, there is a need to recognize that several of these advances could have military applications, making them "dual use" in nature.

The Resolution this year reiterates that access to scientific and technological advances for developmental purposes is, unquestionably a crucial prerequisite for developing countries in their progress for economic growth and to enable them to actively participate in global trade. However, many of these countries are denied access to such technologies because of the persistence of discriminatory control regimes formulated in exclusive groupings of countries that limit the exchanges of such technologies amongst themselves and deny others access to these technologies - even though they may be required by them for peaceful developmental purposes. These regimes often act as non-economic barriers to normal trade and they go against the principles of global economic relations.

It must be recognized that exclusive export control policies were initiated to address proliferation concerns at a time when there were no global agreements that comprehensively addressed the issue. The questions have since arisen whether such exclusive arrangements have really been effective in achieving their stated purpose of strengthening the international non-proliferation regime – especially in the context of scientific and technological applications related to advanced weapons or weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The Chemical Weapons Convention – the first multilateral disarmament agreement of a universal character eliminating a complete class of weapons of mass destruction, offers an opportunity to put in place a multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory, legal mechanism that would simultaneously address proliferation concerns emanating from unregulated transfers - while promoting the economic development of States Parties. The said Chemical Weapons Convention has placed an obligation on States Parties to review their existing national regulations in the field of trade in chemicals in order to ensure that they are consistent with the objectives of the Convention.

However, the persistence of certain ad hoc control regimes creating two categories of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention reminds us of the need for early implementation of all the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to safeguard its long term viability.

The set back to negotiations for an effective protocol that would have strengthened the effectiveness and implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 has, unfortunately, prevented the realization of an effective system of regulations of transfers of agents, toxins, equipment and technologies relevant to the Convention duly avoiding any measures that could hamper the economic development of States Parties.

The lack of a genuinely non-discriminatory universal agreement regarding nuclear weapons has also reduced the effectiveness of efforts to achieve non-proliferation in the nuclear field. Nuclear non-proliferation, in all its aspects, includes the need for measures that would promote nuclear disarmament and the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons. The absence of disarmament benchmark makes it difficult to implement nuclear non-proliferation – or accurately measure it.

Mr. Chairman, India has been consistent in its stand that proliferation concerns regarding materials and technologies related to advance weapons systems, weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory agreements which are transparent and open to universal participation. The reflection of this principle in multilateral disarmament agreements would improve their effectiveness and also create an added impetus for their universality.

What is needed today is an effective and transparent system of export control of technologies that would be in line with the objectives of non-proliferation in all its aspects without affecting the peaceful application of these technologies. There is an urgent need to address this critical issue that can profoundly change the quality of life of people all over the world in a fair and transparent manner. India, along with co-sponsors of this resolution, hopes

that this resolution will receive wide support in this Committee. My delegation recommends this resolution for adoption by this Committee.

Thank you.

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